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"The Prostitution of the Russian Flag": Privateers in Russian Admiralty Courts, 1787-1798
In 1794, the Russian Empire convened the first high admiralty court for appeals to review petitions of merchants and privateers embroiled in the second Russian-Ottoman war of Catherine II's reign (1787-1791). The Commission of Archipelago Affairs, as this admiralty court was called, decided over 170 cases on the basis of Russian maritime law and its interpretation of the law of nations concerning commercial navigation and privateers. A year into its work, the Commission determined that one case sat at the center of most disputes that pitted merchants against Russian-flagged privateers: the affair of Lambros Katsonis. The Commission's decisions for most of the cases on its docket rested on its determination of Katsonis's standing in the Russian Empire. Once decided, the outcome to the matter went on to define the distinction between Russian privateers and naval officers in Russian law -precedents that shaped Russian naval practices for the next fifty years.
The Russian appellate commission's inquiry into the legal standing of combatants commonly known as privateers (korsary or kapery in Russian) was not so far removed from similar queries in other seafaring states and empires at the time. In 1795, Georg Friedrich de Martens published his famous Essay on Privateers, a topic he saw as immensely relevant to the ongoing European maritime wars. 1 With the waters around Europe and beyond sites of captures and reprisals, Martens saw it topical to inquire into "the origins of [...] privateers, and the laws subsisting with respect to them..." while recognizing that general knowledge of the law of nations and universal principles of Europe was not enough, and one ought to inquire into the "public laws and interests of every state in particular." 2 At the end of the tumultuous eighteenth century rife with legal disputes over prize doctrine and neutral states' rights to commerce and navigation at sea in wartime, to Martens, as to his contemporaries Thomas Hartwell Horne who translated his essay into English and the American lawyer Henry Wheaton, a full understanding of the laws and practices of privateering appeared to be necessary and practical. 3 To these jurists, as to the Russian government, the question of the legal basis of privateering seemed of central concern to state policy as well as to individual practitioners of activities surrounding prize taking.
The ongoing Revolutionary Wars in Europe at the time of Martens' treatise wrought havoc on merchant shipping in European waters and beyond. As had been the case for most of the eighteenth century, privateers were still deemed to be the biggest perpetrators of maritime commercial violence. According to the data assembled by David J. Starkey, there were around 1800 actual vessels commissioned in Britain in the period 1793-1815. 4 The battle over commerce raiding continued in admiralty courts, and both the High Court of Admiralty and the U.S. Federal
Courts often decided in favor of their nations' privateers in prize cases. 5 Devastating trade prospects compelled merchants to move their capital away from commercial vessels to financing privateers. 6 If studies of British naval power suggest that by the end of the eighteenth century privateers played a less significant role than they had before, this had little reflection on other states such as Russia and the United States issuing letters of marque and relying on auxiliary naval forces to augment their strength at sea. 7 The turbulent Spanish American revolutions in the 1820s provided further opportunities for commerce raiding and maritime predation and the revolutionary governments issued letters of marque to U.S. privateers. 8 As a longtime practice of European empires, but a relatively recent one for the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century, privateering offers an insight into Russian legal acculturation as the empire used European legal discourse to frame its practices. The study of privateers and admiralty courts is by no means new, but the aim of this article is to examine how European understandings of privateers held up to Russia's legal scrutiny. The few studies on
Russian engagement with the law of nations in the eighteenth century point to a successful, but perhaps uncritical, appropriation of standards of western international law by Russian diplomats and statesmen. 9 The laws of maritime warfare, in particular, offer an example of a practice for which there were few preexisting legal antecedents in Russia; in the late eighteenth century privateers became a wholly new legal category in Russian naval service. 10 For this reason, it is especially interesting to examine which aspects of Russian practice were similar to other European practices and which were sui generis. This article will begin with an overview of the historical context in which the Russian Empire first commissioned large-scale use of privateers and examine the legal instruments through which it sought to control them; it will then turn to 12 Sovereign consent came in the form of letters of marque or reprisals, authorizing the use of the flag as well as legal condemnation of a prize in an admiralty court, allowing the privateer to collect prize money from the sale of the prize and its cargo. Russian maritime law similarly sought to legitimize the privateers' actions while insulating the government from obligations to the privateers or on their behalf. While the entire western legal canon seemed to take the designation of a privateer as an a priori legal designation stemming from a financial or legal arrangement, in Russia it was this very distinction that sat at the heart of the Katsonis case. 13 As this article shows, the Russian Empire appropriated a wholly different standard for determining who was a privateer, not through ownership but through moral qualities. Faced with the question of whether Lambros Katsonis was a privateer, the Commission for Archipelago Affairs evaluated his actions based on eyewitness testimony and made their judgment of his moral character as the basis for its determination. It is tempting to attribute this difference to the old reading of Russian law as lacking the inalienability of private property. 14 But as the discussion in the Commission for Archipelago Affairs shows, the idea of state and private ownership of vessels was well understood by all the participants in the case. On the contrary, the legal differences to which I point rested on the ethos of the combatants themselves and had much more to do with the ways in which the phenomenon of privateering under the Russian flag unfolded.
Russian Privateers in the Eighteenth Century
In commissioning privateers the Russian Empire drew on a long tradition of supplementing its army with irregular forces, yet this specific kind of combatant had much to do with Russian encroachment into the Eastern Mediterranean in the late eighteenth century. In the reign of admiralty patents, to whom they entrusted this power, and to relay other logistics of commerce raiding. 26 The structure and proceedings of Russian prize courts, however, was more comparable to the French Conseil des Prises in which the commission that determined the legitimacy of prize vessels consisted of members appointed by the monarch. 27 Much as they did in the French system, Russian privateers relied on consuls throughout the Mediterranean region to help equip their ships, recruit crews, and serve on prize commissions. 28 In common with existing European practice, the Russian Empire regulated its privateers through individual patents, detailed rules and instructions, and with the assistance of prize courts.
Indeed, in Russia as elsewhere, the entire enterprise of sanctioning and controlling privateers relied on regulation. 29 The Russian government expected its privateers to adhere to prescribed procedures in capturing merchant vessels, searching neutral vessels, and taking prisoners. The
Rules for Privateers, which enumerated the standards of behavior for privateers under the Russian flag in twenty-seven statutes, were translated into several languages and circulated among the privateer captains. 30 The prize court (or prize commission, in Russian parlance)
formed the cornerstone of this system. Privateers were expected to bring captured vessels and cargo to the nearest neutral or allied port for a thorough examination by a prize commission, which would assess the legality of the capture and condemn the vessel as a good prize, allowing the booty to be sold at public auction and the privateer to be remunerated with nine-tenths of the sum received. The prize commissions were required to provide both the petitioners and privateers with copies of their decisions -legal record of the event, which could then form the basis of an appeal of a consul or commission's decision concerning a captured prize to the Russian imperial court (dvor).
These practices, fine-tuned by European empires and their admiralty courts over However, the aftermath of the 1768 war and developments in Russia's policy towards seaborne raiding in the 1780s accounted for notable differences in the role privateers played in the second Russian-Ottoman war. In the intervening period, the government had taken a more resolute stance on the subject of neutral commerce at sea, declaring maritime trade an inviolable right and taking efforts to protect neutral rights. 32 Russia's interpretations of the laws regarding the permissibility of seizing merchant vessels or enemy cargo were codified in several pieces of legislation and became the cornerstone of what Russian officials referred to as the "neutral system." At the same time, Russia changed its reward structure for privateers, introducing strong financial incentives to attract irregular combatants and reward them handsomely for their service. 33 The sudden outbreak of a war with Sweden in the summer of 1788 kept the Baltic Sea fleet occupied in the north of Europe and Russian-flagged privateers were the only Russian armed ships in the Mediterranean during the war. Without a strong official naval presence, the government attempted to introduce consular oversight to regulate the privateers; but, in reality, the government had few tools with which to restrain the unsavory activities of these soldiers of fortune.
Despite structural changes introduced in the 1787 war that marked many naval auxiliaries as distinct, it was still unclear who among the combatants fit the newly appropriated term "privateer." True to what historian Eric Lohr has described as a "separate deal" model, Russian commanders recruited a variety of foreigners to serve the Russian Empire under different terms and contracts and by far not all naval officers pledged an oath to the Russian monarch. 34 Among the variations of terms of service to the Russian crown were the propensity of British subjects to request a separate schedule for the allocation and distribution of prize money while three
Corsican captains asked for an enlistment bonus for all recruits and a priest for their exclusivelyCorsican battalion. 35 The indeterminate status of privateers vis-à-vis irregular naval troops is best exemplified by the government's decision to organize the flotillas sailing around the Mediterranean into a coordinated force. 36 The flotillas were intended to disrupt food supplies to
Constantinople and divert at least some of the Ottoman naval forces away from the Black Sea, or, in Matthew Anderson's words, to add "nuisance value." 37 One flotilla consisted of state-owned ships captained by Lieutenant Samuel de Chaplet of the Russian Navy. In anticipation of hostilities with the Ottoman Empire over Russia's annexation of Crimea, Anton Psaro and other
Russian agents had begun making preparations -purchasing ships and stockpiling timber -for Russian naval action in the region. 38 Under the assumption that the Baltic fleet would soon arrive in the Mediterranean, as it had in the previous war, the state-owned flotilla had seemingly done very little before 1789. After the Swedish declaration of war in 1788 detained the Baltic fleet in the northern seas, Russian command placed Guglielmo Lorenzo, a corsair from Malta and one of at least a dozen other officers recruited into Russian service, in charge of the state-owned flotilla's nine vessels. 39 The second flotilla was headed by Lambros Katsonis, who had been terrorizing Mediterranean commerce since early 1788 and had already acquired a reputation as a notorious blaggard among many of the region's officials. 40 The Lupandin -and two from the Department of Government Revenues -Ivan A. Naryshkin and Karl F. Moderakh -it then operated until 1798. 43 As Catherine herself noted, "keeping the flotillas in the Mediterranean Sea in the latest war against Turkey [sic] was both costly and troublesome" for Russia. 44 Indeed, the costs were not only financial but also political.
Instructions given to the Commission offered little by way of guidance, but the emphasis on procedure, evidence, and validity suggests the importance of the veneer of legality to the Commission's proceedings. The Commission was instructed to "rule on" the grievances presented before them "with due process" and to present to Catherine "those what were shown to be valid." 45 The cases were adjudicated according to the Rules for Privateers and, where appropriate, the Naval Statute of 1720. But the Commission's understanding of the sources of autocratic law extended beyond laws and edicts issued by the monarch; the Commission evaluated orders and instructions from the monarch and military superiors as sources of Russian law. 46 Dispatches from senior military officials such as Vice-Admiral Samuel Gibbs and Lieutenant-General Ivan Zaborovskii to their subordinates were treated by the Commission as legally-binding instructions. As others have shown, this emphasis on legal process was fairly typical of Catherine II's reign. 47 But unlike domestic legal initiatives from the Legislative Commission to the equity courts, which had mixed results, the Commission for Archipelago
Affairs proved successful in establishing itself as a credible adjudicator of petitions and claims within its jurisdiction. 48 It was a felicitous example of Russia's practice of law-based governance.
As an institution, the Commission for Archipelago Affairs presented a unique example of Russian legal practice that drew on international norms and sought to make its decisions The most important question before the Commission was the legal status of these combatants. As the Commission insisted, the status of the flotilla was central to resolving other cases such as whether to pay salaries, prize money amounts, or reimbursements to merchants.
The Commission issued its first decisions to hundreds of Katsonis's crewmembers towards the end of 1794. In each of these cases the Commission universally denied salaries and wages to the petitioners on the basis that they were privateers. One typical denial read:
As the named petitioner Major Ziguri served on Colonel Lambros Katsonis's flotilla, which was as the facts of the case show organized as a privateer flotilla, and not from the treasury and which during its operations in searching for the enemy is not only entitled to any salary, but also the privateer must on the basis of Article 9 pay one-tenth to the treasury. Consequently, he is not entitled to a salary for serving under
Lambros Katsonis in time of war, and in light of Articles 1 and 9 of the aforementioned Rules, he is not entitled to 2000 florins for arming the frigate Achilles. 54 The Commission's rationale rested on a distinction that it drew between a state (kazennaia) flotilla and Katsonis's private or free (vol'naia) flotilla. At first glance, the Commission's decision seemed to reinforce the conventional understanding between the two, in which the crew of the former were entitled to wages and provisions from the Treasury, while the crew of the latter would be paid solely out of their prize money. However, the Commission's decision not to use Treasury funds to pay Katsonis's crew stemmed from a moral judgment of Katsonis and his men, rather than from a doctrinal definition of a privateer in contemporary international law. 55 Behind the Commission's differentiation between the two flotillas lay a more nuanced understanding of what constituted state service and its relationship to the common good.
The ownership structure of the flotillas -one owned by Katsonis and the other by the state -went some ways towards resolving the ambiguity of their legal rights and entitlements, but it was not the starting point of the Commission's reasoning but rather its direct consequence.
The distinction was not theoretical but material, and the livelihood of hundreds hung in the balance. Despite the salience that ownership of private property acquired in Russia during
Catherine's reign, even Katsonis's initial claims to ownership of his flotilla were not absolute. 56 Even if no procedure for expropriating private property existed in civil law, the Russian government had centuries of practice in mobilizing private or civilian resources for military purposes. The process existed in several forms, from making contracts with merchants at favorable (for the government) rates for delivery of provisions or timber, to purchasing or requisitioning merchant ships for military use. In the Aegean archipelago in wartime, under the nebulous "laws of war," Russian commanders took ships, provisions, and supplies as needed.
When the local population provided these necessities willingly, they were reimbursed -often below market rate -for their property; otherwise provisions and supplies were claimed by force as if from enemy populations. The Russian government even reserved its right to employ its privateers in a military capacity in 60 But the idea that Katsonis's status changed from "privateer" to "Russian officer" came from Katsonis himself.
Sensing the government's need for his services, he had apparently let the government's favor go to his head. Refusing to follow instructions given to him by Zaborovskii and Gibbs, Katsonis boasted "he was in charge and dependent on no one." Katsonsis's insistence that he was no longer a privateer, but rather the head of an imperial Russian squadron robbed Gibbs of means to restrain him. "Perhaps he has secret orders that he has not shared with me," he surmised. 61 Katsonis's posturing as a Russian officer inclined potential would-be privateers to join his flotilla and creditors to lend him large sums. As later claimed in their appeals to the Commission, they truly believed that they were dealing with an agent of the Russian government. For example, in his letters to the Commission, Lorenzo Aleandri, a captain who had previously served under the Guglielmo Lorenzi in the state flotilla, explained that Katsonis presented himself as a Russian officer, had a patent, and flew not a privateering flag but a naval ensign. 62 Katsonis's misrepresentation of his status was likely at the root of the many requests for salaries which his former crew submitted to the Russian government as well as the similarity in the language and arguments the petitioners presented. Evidently, the Commission was confused as well, but ultimately relied on testimony provided by commanders in the field to determine that Katsonis and his crew were privateers, as reflected in the Commission's 1794 decisions. Vasilii S.
Tomara's memorandum on the course of events in the Archipelago, written shortly after the Treaty of Jassy was signed in 1792, supported the legal distinction between the two flotillas. 63 Even Zaborovskii, whose instructions were the source of Katsonis's claims to be an officer, clarified that he considered Katsonis a privateer, underscoring that the money paid by the Treasury for his vessels and his debts was intended to be repaid by Katsonis from the prizes he captured. Katsonis's arguments gained traction with the monarch herself, and in light of his assertions to be a Russian officer, the Commission was instructed to reassess its previous decisions with a new periodization of the flotilla's activities. The flotilla's activities were reclassified into three phases, each of different legal standing: in 1788, they were privateers; from 1789 until the ceasefire in 1791, they were in state service; after the peace, Katsonis acted without government authority. 68 In contravention of this instruction, the Commission determined on 21 June 1795 that Katsonis's claims that his flotilla had been appropriated by the Treasury was "entirely incorrect" (est' sovsem ne spravedlivo). 69 In their next report, the Commission addressed all of the warrants that Katsonis provided in support of his claims to be a Russian officer. Most cleverly, they invoked Article 22 of the Rules for Privateers, which anticipated the need for privateers to cooperate with the Russian navy as part of the service that all privateers owed to the Russian crown for authorizing their activities. In the Commission's interpretation of Article 22, Zaborovskii had every right to issue instructions to Katsonis as he was acting on Her Imperial Majesty's wishes and instructions. This broad power gave the Russian navy the right to determine the location for Katsonis's activities (which, they claimed, was the most profitable for intercepting Ottoman vessels without competition from corsairs from Malta and Sardinia). In response to Katsonis's other arguments about his obligations to report to superiors or coordinate with other flotillas, the Commission deferred to testimony from Major-General Psaro, Gibbs, and Tomara, which stated that Katsonis had never followed through on instructions to coordinate or connect with Lorenzi's flotilla, or any of the other orders issued to him by Gibbs, head of flotilla activities in the Mediterranean. In short, the Commission decided that Zaborovskii's orders were anticipated by several of the articles in the Rules for Privateers and, as a result, it stood by its decision of considering Katsonis a privateer throughout the 1787 war with the Ottoman Empire.
These conclusions, the Commission further declared, obviated any need for reassessment of its decisions in its previous cases.
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On the basis of its earlier decision that he was a privateer, the Commission decided that the State Treasury would not be responsible for Katsonis's numerous debts. 71 More extraordinarily still, the Commission upheld its decision after being rebuked by the Procurator General and the monarch for a second time and asked to reevaluate its decision once more. 72 In its second response, the Commission emphasized that it based the decision on Russian law and on the testimony of the highest commanders of the Russian forces in the Archipelago during the war. The distinction between the flotillas' status in the eighteenth century was more than a question of ownership. It hinged on a judgment of the combatants' motivation. As legal articulations of a public or common good were still in their infancy, the Commission's judgment rested on what it deemed to be the underlying purpose of Katsonis's activities. 81 Only a few days after it upheld its ruling, the Commission's reasoning was accepted by the new emperor Paul and his new Procurator General of the Senate, Alexander B. Kurakin. Katsonis and his crew, eventually arriving at a figure of nearly 600,000 rubles. It should be noted that the money was intended not for Katsonis alone, but given to him to satisfy his creditors and distribute among his crew of several hundred. 85 The government's commitment to rewarding its privateers was also evident in the charitable interpretation of the evidence Katsonis provided to support his claims to large rewards.
Ultimately, the main source for Katsonis's claims was his own testimony of his successes in the battlefield, while much of the corroborating evidence -such as his ship log, ownership papers, and even many of the ships he claimed to have captured -was conveniently destroyed in his final skirmish with the Ottoman navy. 86 His largest score was the capture of the island of Zea [Kea] and its fortress, which he claimed to have done in compliance with a secret order from the deceased Prince Grigorii A. Potëmkin-Tavricheskii. While the Commission recognized that Katsonis could prove neither the provenance of the order nor verify his extended presence on the island, it considered correspondence addressed to Katsonis on the island of Kea and subsequent mission instructions to sail from the island as substantiation of his presence on Kea. From this, the Commission reasoned that if Katsonis had been on the island, then he must have needed to take certain measures to secure it and defend his crew. From this deduction, the Commission validated Katsonis's request for reimbursement for the fortifications he built on the island.
Following this pattern of reasoning, the Commission recognized the validity of Potëmkin's oral instructions. 87 In another instance, when determining payment for captured prisoners, the Commission relied on consular transactions concerning sale, ransom, and exchange of prisoners to come to a total of the number of persons from which it would reward Katsonis. 88 The
Commission's willingness to accept Katsonis's claims stands in striking contrast to the rigorous analysis of other petitioners' requests for reimbursement of stolen property. Katsonis's own requests were punctuated with an impressive knowledge and understanding of the law, but even when petitioners did not reference specific statutes in their requests the Commission drew on all available legislation to guide its decisions.
For merchants
The Commission for Archipelago Affairs also served as a forum that provided merchants with legal recourse in the event of capture or maltreatment by Russian-flagged privateers. Indeed, this function of the prize court was an important component of the government's attempt to regulate the maritime violence it unleashed. The Russian government was sensitive to the impositions that war caused to neutral trade and was even more aware that authorizing privateers posed a significant risk to the Orthodox Christians sailing under Ottoman flags. 89 The delicate wording of the Rules for Privateers was designed to avoid these molestations, but the Russian government nevertheless foresaw the need for additional mechanisms to satisfy aggrieved merchants.
Merchant complaints travelled through several channels and by no means did all of them end up in front of the Commission. 90 Many merchants submitted complaints to their countries' consular representatives, who in turn complained to Russian officials posted around the Mediterranean.
Eventually, word of these assaults reached Vice-Admiral Gibbs, who found himself powerless to compel Katsonis to return unlawfully seized property. 91 Outstanding grievances then reached the Commission for Archipelago Affairs after the end of the war, and the Commission had the authority to recognize illegally taken prizes and compel restitution or reimbursement. A Greek merchant from Livorno, for example, who showed that he had been captured in 1792, after the end of the war, was able to successfully recoup most of his losses from the illegal capture by filing a case with the Commission. 92 The biggest problem for the merchants in recouping their losses, however, was that in many cases the property they sought to have returned or compensated had not been taken by force. The Commission received numerous complaints from merchants, townspeople, and businessmen who had supplied the Russian flotillas with armaments, cash for provisions and supplies, crewmembers, loans and credit, bespoke dishes and barrels, and other high-cost items. 93 There were dozens of complaints from merchants from Trieste, Messina, Livorno, Zante, and other places claiming to have provided credit and provisions with the expectation that either Katsonis or the Russian government would reimburse them at the end of the war. 94 In contravention to the promises and representations Katsonis made to his creditors, the Commission determined in many of these instances that it was not obliged to pay for privateers' expenses.
Although the Commission sought to distinguish between voluntary donations of money and supplies and seizures of these items by force, in actuality this distinction was misleading.
The Rules forbade the capture of Christian vessels or property, a law to which numerous petitions pointed to when protesting the seizure of friendly nations' vessels and cargo, and one which the Commission upheld. 95 Certainly, many were willing to supply Russian combatants in the battle against the Ottoman Empire. However, others who wished to provide food or supplies feared Ottoman retribution for their assistance to the Russian forces. Captain Stepan P.
Khmetevskii reported in his memoirs that sympathetic farmers often urged Russian forces to pretend to take provisions and livestock by force. 96 In other cases, privateers paid merchants and farmers for the produce and livestock they took, or offered a letter of credit. But as Lambros
Katsonis's testimony to the Commission in response to an accusation of theft shows, Katsonis considered taking property from Ottoman subjects or on Ottoman territories as legal under the laws of war. The Commission upheld his reasoning, refusing payment for any property that was claimed by Russian irregulars by right of war. 97 Katsonis's actions suggest that merchants who did not voluntarily provision the troops might have their property seized anyway under a perfectly legal pretext. 98 In contrast, merchants who gave Katsonis or his captains money, loans, or supplies received a passport that allegedly protected them from further searches or seizures by Russianflagged privateers for the remainder of the war. As the Commission's records show, many merchants were willing to extend credit to the privateer flotillas for a variety of reasons. Chief among them was the perceived credibility of the investment, as they were led to believe that by dealing with Katsonis they were dealing with the Russian government. Katsonis's credibility as an agent of the Russian government was only increased by his assumed power to distribute patents to privateers and travel passports to merchants. As a result, more than a few merchants found themselves disappointed by the Commission's final decisions.
Russian Maritime Law After Katsonis
Within the confines of bureaucracy and procedure, which at times restrained the decisions of the Commission of Archipelago Affairs, many have suggested that achieving justice or fairness was an impossible task. Still, the Russian government empowered this appellate-level admiralty court to resolve the deluge of merchant and privateer requests. In substance, if not in procedure, the cases were adversarial as they placed the interests of the privateers in having vessels and cargo condemned as prize against those of the merchants seeking restitution for their property. The true significance of these cases was that even though neither side could be truly satisfied, the turn to Russia's admiralty courts gave the courts legitimacy and reaffirmed their credibility as arbiters of disputes. Whichever side of the prize case they fell on, Ottoman subjects flocked to Russian admiralty courts, creating the conditions of and adding to the perception of encroachment on Ottoman sovereignty that lay at the heart of the Eastern Question. For one thing, the Russian admiralty no longer seemed conflicted about their motivations.
Having decided that a privateer's status had more to do with his financial motivations than the relationship to the state, the Russian commission elided the debates in other parts of Europe about the morality of privateering. 100 In 1854, when moral outrage combined with political expediency to compel the first international agreements to abolish privateering, the Russian navy looked to its previous experiences with Katsonis and other privateers in an effort to organize new fleets to assist with commerce raiding in the Crimean War. 101 Russian consular officials and naval commanders recruited privateers in naval campaigns throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, but to my knowledge none of these recruits were Russian subjects. In fact, in response to a proposal at the height of the Napoleonic Wars to permit Russian subjects to sail as privateers, the Admiralty College vetoed the proposal. 102 Privateers recruited in the 1806-1807
Mediterranean campaign received less favorable prize payouts than the privateers of the 1787 war received. Naval officers, on the other hand, saw their financial prospects from seizing merchant ships improve dramatically in 1806 with the passage of a new comprehensive prize law.
The decisions of the Commission for Archipelago Affairs demonstrate the difficulties of using European conventions of prize law to understand Russian practice of privateering.
Adopting common European practices required reconciliation with Russian laws and practices more than those who see international law as universal would have us believe. The imperial Russian jurist Fedor F. Martens believed international law to be an essential component of Russia's Europeanization. 103 Like other theoreticians and practitioners of international law in the late nineteenth-century, Martens saw international law as a civilizing process, comparable to that which Russia had undergone through the forceful will of Peter the Great. 104 Martens' view of Russian sovereigns' willing engagement with ideas of the law of nations is at odds with much recent scholarship on the relationship between imperialism and the development of modern international law. The third-world critique of international law, for instance, demonstrates the inherent unevenness and biased categories within which international law operates, challenging the anodyne view of international law among its first proponents and many practitioners today. 105 But what of states like Russia that willingly engaged in a legal discourse with Europe to better and secure their positions in international society? Whatever the role of law inside Russia, the empire used European legal norms to empower its subjects and institutions. It tried to protect these principles by encoding them in its own legislation and upheld them in its own legal system.
Russian elites perpetuated these ideas and spread them to new geographic locales. Through their application to international legal norms, both the empire's elites and its subjects showed that they understood the malleability of these norms and their power to advance their own interests.
Whatever the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century foreign observers wrote of Russia's legal institutions, through its practices the Russian Empire demonstrated that it understood much about the European law of nations and its advantages in helping Russia achieve its imperial aims.
